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Abstract
The European Commission published a White Paper on 2 April 2008 on damages 
actions for breach of EU antitrust rules. The content of the White Paper is since 
then being prepared to be converted into EU legislation on private antitrust 
enforcement. This paper presents the developments in private antitrust enforcement 
in Poland after 2 April 2008. It commences with an outline of EU actions in 
this field which act as an introduction to the more detailed analysis of recent 
jurisprudential and legislative developments in Poland. The latter part of the paper 
covers, in particular, the 2009 Act on the Pursuit of Claims in Group Proceedings 
and the 2011 Act Amending the Civil Procedure Code and Some Other Acts which 
abolishes all specific elements of commercial proceedings, including the statutory 
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‘non-admission of evidence’ principle. These two legal acts are assessed in order 
to establish whether their introduction is likely to help facilitate private antitrust 
enforcement in Poland and to consider to what an extent are these developments 
responding to the challenges outlined by the European Commission. 
Résumé
Le 2 avril 2008 la Commission européenne a publié le Livre blanc sur les actions en 
dommages et intérêts pour infraction aux règles communautaires sur les ententes 
et les abus de position dominante. Le contenu du Livre blanc est dès lors en cours 
de préparation pour être converti en législation de l’UE sur l’application des règles 
de la concurrence par des particuliers. Cet article présente le dévelopement de 
l’application des règles de la concurrence par des particuliers en Pologne après le 
2 avril 2008. Il commence par un aperçu des actions de l’UE dans ce domaine qui 
agit comme une introduction à l’analyse plus détaillée de la jurisprudence récente et 
les évolutions législatives en Pologne. Cette dernière partie du document porte, en 
particulier, sur la Loi de 2009 sur la poursuite des revendications dans les procédures 
collectives et la Loi 2011 modifiant le Code de procédure civile et certaines autres lois 
qui abolisent tous les éléments spécifiques de la procédure commerciale, y compris 
le principe de «non-admission de la preuve». Ces deux actes juridiques sont évaluées 
afin de déterminer si leur mise en place pourrait faciliter l’application des règles 
de la concurrence par des particuliers en Pologne et d’examiner à quel point ces 
développements répondent aux défis formulés par la Commission européenne.
Classifications and key words: private enforcement; bipolar system of enforcement; 
quantification of harm; follow-on actions; collective redress; non-admission of 
evidence; consultation document
I. Introduction
The European Union shares with its Member States the tradition of 
regulating competition in the public interest. Competition restraints within 
the internal market of the European Union that may affect trade between 
Member States fall within the ambit of EU antitrust law1. Those with no effect 
1 For the purposes of this paper antitrust law is seen as area of public laws protecting com-
petition, other than merger control and state aid regulation (an American-style convention). The 
European Commission has in the last years started using the term ‘antitrust’ alongside the tradi-
tional term ‘competition law’ – the two terms are used interchangeably in this paper; W.P.J. Wils, 
Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer? [in:] C.D. Ehlermann, I. Atanasiu (eds.), 
European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of Cartels, Oxford – Portland 
2007, p. 278. 
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on EU trade are covered by national competition rules. Core antitrust values 
have clearly been identified as related to the public interest2. 
Victims of competition restraints should be fully compensated for the 
injuries they suffered, irrespective of the fact whether such restraint affects 
trade between Member States or not. But public antitrust enforcement is 
not a direct way to compensate those who suffered from competition law 
infringements. At the same time, antitrust enforcement in the private interest 
of individual market players always seemed to be in eclipse in Europe. 
The European Commission made it clear in its Green Paper of 2005 – 
Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules (hereafter, the 2005 
Green Paper)3 as well as White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC 
antitrust rules issued on 2 April 2008 (hereafter, the 2008 White Paper)4 that 
some kind of ‘revaluation of values’ is needed. Demand for a more modern 
victim-oriented form of antitrust enforcement exists alongside the growing 
feeling that the period of ‘autocracy’ of public antitrust enforcement should 
come to an end. The European Commission worked out its own theory on 
how to balance the public interest with the private interests of those injured 
by competition restraints. It presented its approach in the two aforementioned 
Papers stating ‘(…) the measures put forward in this White Paper are 
designed to create an effective system of private enforcement by means of 
damages actions that complements, but does not replace or jeopardise, public 
enforcement’. These lines are quoted from the opening chapter of the 2008 
White Paper. The most important measures proposed therein relate to nine 
factors said to influence effective private antitrust enforcement: 1) standing 
(indirect purchasers and collective redress); 2) access to evidence (disclosure 
inter partes); 3) binding effect of decisions by national competition authorities; 
4) fault requirement; 5) calculation of damages; 6) passing-on of overcharges; 
7) limitation periods; 8) costs of damages actions and; last but not least, 
9) interaction between leniency programmes and actions for damages. 
This paper focuses on the Polish approach to private enforcement of 
competition law (both EU and Polish antitrust rules) attempting, at the same 
time, to relate them to the scheme proposed by the European Commission. 
In this context, the question can be justifiably asked whether any attempts 
were made after the 2008 White Paper to fill existing gaps in Polish legislation 
regarding antitrust enforcement. Another question that arises here is whether it 
is possible to balance the public interest with the private interests of those who 
suffered from competition restraints or, in other words, whether it is possible 
2 See C. Kosikowski, Publiczne prawo gospodarcze Polski i Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2010, 
p. 314, 322 et seq.
3 COM(2005)672.
4 COM(2008)165.
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to balance public enforcement with private enforcement in Poland. Would it be 
possible to replicate, even only partially, the success of private enforcement in 
the United States?5 While the ineffectiveness of private antitrust enforcement in 
Poland has been known for at least a decade6, have the authorities done anything 
to identify how to best address this problem? Have they learnt necessary lessons 
from other jurisdictions and taken any legislative actions in this area? Although 
a good deal of academic research has been devoted to this issue in recent years7, 
its results are yet to be used for legislative purposes.
II. EU developments after the 2008 White Paper
The need for a mechanism enabling the aggregation of individual claims 
of antitrust victims has been identified as a problem to be solved in the 2008 
White Paper. At the end of 2008, the Commission published a Green Paper 
on consumer collective redress8 as part of its wider initiative in this field 
(managed by the Directorate-General for Health and Consumers). 
5 Private plaintiffs brought 96.76% of the 555 civil antitrust lawsuits filed in US federal 
courts in the 12 months ending 31 March 2011 (97.00% of the 666 lawsuits in the 12 months 
ending 31 March 2010; 97.79% of the 1086 lawsuits in the 12 months ending 31 March 2009; 
96.80% of the 1063 lawsuits in the 12 months ending 31 March 2008; 98.71% of the 1165 
lawsuits in the 12 months ending 31 March 2007). See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics.aspx. A decline 
in the number of antitrust lawsuits since 2009 is thus visible. On the face of it, there seems to 
be a continuing judicial trend of limiting the ability of private plaintiffs to seek relief under 
antitrust rules. See also The Handbook of Competition Enforcement Agencies 2008. A Global 
Competition Review Special Report, London 2008, p. 304.
6 P. Podrecki wrote in 2000 about difficulties in antitrust damages actions; P. Podrecki, 
Porozumienia monopolistyczne i ich cywilnoprawne skutki, Kraków 2000, p. 282. 
7 In alphabetical order: M. Bernatt, ‘Prywatny model ochrony konkurencji oraz jego 
realizacja w postępowaniu przed sądem krajowym’, [in:] E. Piontek (ed.), Nowe tendencje 
w prawie konkurencji UE, Warszawa 2008, p. 299 et seq.; A. Jurkowska, ‘Antitrust Private 
Enforcement – Case of Poland’ (2008) 1(1) YARS; M. Kolasiński, ‘Odpowiedzialność 
cywilna za szkody powstałe w wyniku naruszenia wspólnotowych zakazów stosowania praktyk 
ograniczających konkurencję i nadużywania pozycji dominującej’ (2007) 11 Przegląd Prawa 
Handlowego; O. Kopiczko, ‘Prywatnoprawne stosowanie wspólnotowego prawa konkurencji’ 
(2005) 2 Prawo i Podatki Unii Europejskiej; B. Nowak-Chrząszczyk, ‘Roszczenie odszkodowawcze 
w postępowaniu w sprawie o naruszenie wspólnotowego prawa konkurencji’, [in:] E. Piontek 
(ed.), Nowe tendencje…; A. Piszcz, ‘Wybrane problemy związane ze stosowaniem prawa 
antymonopolowego Unii Europejskiej przez sądy krajowe’, [in:] N. Szczęch (ed.), Księga 
Jubileuszowa z okazji 5-lecia Wydziału Prawa Wyższej Szkoły Menedżerskiej w Legnicy „Ius est ars 
boni et aequi”, Legnica 2010, p. 547 et seq.; P. Podrecki, ‘Civil Law Actions in the Context of 
Competition Restricting Practices under Polish Law’ (2009) 2(2) YARS.
8 COM(2008)794, 27/11/08. 
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Also announced in the 2008 White Paper was the fact that the Commission 
intended to draw-up non-binding guidelines on quantifying harm caused 
by antitrust violations. During the drafting process, the Commission 
commissioned a study on the quantification of harm suffered by victims of 
competition law infringements (prepared in 2009 by a group of lawyers and 
economists). Following the publication of the study, the Commission organised 
also a workshop with external economists on 26 January 2010 regarding this 
very issue. 
Contrary to its initial intentions, the Commission soon engaged in the 
preparation of a draft directive on the rules governing damages actions for 
breach of EU antitrust rules9. It seemed by 2009 that the 2008 White Paper 
would end up as the basis for the preparation of an act of EU hard law 
(directive) rather than the originally envisaged act of soft law (guidelines). 
EU Member States could expect, therefore, to be put under more pressure 
in this context than ever before. 
The beginning of 2010 brought about another shift when Joaquín Almunia 
took over the role of the European Commissioner for competition from 
Neelie Kroes (who seems to have done more than any other Commissioner 
to bring private antitrust enforcement out of its ‘ivory tower’ of ineffectiveness 
and isolation). The draft directive was withdrawn as a result and the new 
Commissioner got involved in questions of collective redress and the 
quantification of harm in antitrust damages actions. In his speech entitled 
‘Common standards for group claims across the EU’10, delivered on 15 October 
2010, the new Commissioner has shown a particularly urgent and practical 
concern for collective redress. 
The issue that seems to have been abandoned by the Commission in that 
period of time was the requirement of ‘fault’. The Commission came to the 
conclusion in the 2008 White Paper that once the victim had shown a breach 
of EU antitrust law, the infringer should be liable for damages caused, unless 
it demonstrated that the infringement was the result of a genuinely excusable 
error. The Commission proposed at that time that an error would be considered 
excusable if a reasonable person applying high standards of care could not have 
been aware of the fact that the conduct in question restricted competition. 
It is worth noting that the European Parliament eventually opposed this 
concept in a 2009 Resolution concerning the 2008 White Paper on damages 
actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules. The European Parliament stressed 
therein ‘that a culpable act must always be a prerequisite for an action for 
 9 See also P. Callol, ‘Spain’ [in:] A. A. Foer, J. W. Cuneo, The International Handbook on 
Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Cheltenham – Northampton 2010, p. 394.
10 SPEECH/10/554; University of Valladolid, School of Law Valladolid; available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/554.
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damages, and that a breach of the EC competition rules must, at the least, be 
negligent unless national law provides that there is an automatic implication or 
rebuttable presumption of fault in the case of a breach of the EC competition 
rules, ensuring the consistent and coherent enforcement of competition law’11. 
It seems that the Commission has chosen since then to pursue further merely 
two out of the nine factors listed in the 2008 White Paper as affecting private 
antitrust enforcement. This realisation is supported by the 2011 Commission 
Work Programme with its scheduled adoption in 2011 of only communications 
affecting private antitrust enforcement:
– a communication presenting a set of common principles that shall guide 
any future legislative proposals concerning collective redress, including 
in the antitrust field, 
– a communication on quantification of harm in antitrust damages 
actions12.
In the first half of 2011, the Commission released a Staff Working Docu-
ment – Public Consultation: Towards a Coherent European Approach to 
Collective Redress13. The act was preceded by a Joint Information Note of 
the Commissioners for Justice, Competition and Consumer Policy on the 
need for a coherent European approach to Collective Redress. From 17 June 
2011 to 30 September 2011, the Commission held a public consultation on its 
draft Guidance Paper on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on 
breaches of Article 101 or 102 TFEU14. The draft Paper presented the main 
methods and techniques used to quantify antitrust harm. The consultation 
was accompanied by a workshop with economists held on 27 September 2011. 
The Commission has not advanced the issue further since then. An EU 
framework for collective redress has been entered into the 2012 Commission 
Work Programme as one of its initiatives15 alongside actions for damages for 
antitrust violations (legislative initiatives). One of the objectives of the latter 
is to clarify the interrelation of damages actions with public enforcement of 
EU antitrust law by the Commission and National Competition Authorities 
(hereafter, NCAs), notably as regards the protection of leniency programmes, 
in order to preserve the central role of public antitrust enforcement in the 
11 Reported in: OJ [2010] C 117E/161.
12 Annexes to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
Commission Work Programme 2011, COM(2010)623.
13 SEC(2011)173.
14 The draft Guidance Paper is available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/
2011_actions_damages/draft_guidance_paper_en.pdf.
15 Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – 
Commission Work Programme 2012, COM(2011) 777.
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EU. Protection of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions 
is also the subject of a Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of the European 
Competition Authorities of 23 May 201216. 
Attempts to provide quick solutions to the lack of effective private antitrust 
enforcement in Europe have proven beyond the powers of the Commission. 
However, it may be better to avoid ‘quick fix’ measures here and aim instead 
to formulate a long-term strategy for a continuous increase in the level of ‘just’ 
compensation and ordered progress in ‘sustainable antitrust enforcement’. The 
next sections of this paper will present in detail the developments in private 
antitrust enforcement in Poland after 200817. Are there reasons to believe that 
Polish initiatives were inspired by the actions of the European Commission? 
To avoid misunderstandings, it is not the intention of this paper to compare 
the range and scale of Polish solutions to that of the EU because even at first 
glance, Polish initiatives seem so small that a comparison would be difficult.
III. The private antitrust enforcement developments in Poland
1. Prologue
The publication of the 2008 White Paper coincided almost exactly with the 
first anniversary of the Polish Act of 16 February 2007 on Competition and 
Consumer Protection (hereafter, Competition Act)18. Although its authors 
could not draw an inspiration from the 2008 White Paper, they were surely 
familiar with the earlier Green Paper of 2005. One of the most important 
innovations introduced by the current Competition Act was the elimination 
of the possibility to commence administrative proceedings in antitrust 
matters (called ‘antimonopoly’ proceedings in the Competition Act) on the 
basis of a complaint. Since 21 April 2007, all antitrust proceedings in Poland 
are therefore initiated ex officio. In the modernisation process of Polish 
competition law, the initiation of proceedings by way of a complaint was thus 
made impossible. This change was, in the opinion of some commentators, 
unwarranted and thus incurred a great deal of criticism19. However, the 
16 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/leniency_material_protection_en.pdf.
17 Information contained herein was last updated on 26/07/12.
18 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 50, item 331, as amended.
19 E.g. M. Bernatt, Sprawiedliwość proceduralna w postępowaniu przed organem ochrony 
konkurencji, Warszawa 2011, p. 158 et seq. But see M. Krasnodębska-Tomkiel, D. Szafrański, 
‘Skuteczność prawa antymonopolowego’, [in:] T. Giaro (ed.), Skuteczność prawa, Warszawa 
2010, p. 107–108.
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explanatory notes to the draft bill20 state that the said amendment was in 
fact inspired by EU’s aim to promote private antitrust enforcement, which 
the 2005 Green Paper is related to. The explanatory notes stress that public 
antitrust enforcement is not meant to protect individual interests. In this light, 
the authors of the Competition Act 2007 stressed the existence of a bipolar 
system of public and private enforcement of antitrust rules. 
The above postulate seems to have little in common with the approach 
of the Commission. Neither the 2005 Green Paper nor the 2008 White 
Paper encourage the elimination of antitrust proceedings initiated by way 
of a complaint. Neither do they postulate any other such ‘bipolarisation’ 
of competition law enforcement. In this sense, the European Commission 
saw information contained in its own documents used for purposes it might 
have not approved of. Whatever the views might be on commencing antitrust 
proceedings on a complaint, EU competition law is being enforced by the 
Commission according to a ‘tandem model’ whereby it may, pursuant to 
Article 7(1) of Regulation 1/2003, initiate proceedings either on a complaint 
or on its own initiative21. 
2. Binding effect of administrative decisions (jurisprudential developments)
The explanatory notes to the draft Competition Act state also that abolishing 
administrative proceedings initiated by way of a complaint is beneficial for 
competition as such (‘institutional phenomenon’) as well as for those injured 
by competition restraints. This benefit is associated with the shortening of 
overly long administrative proceedings. Their excessive length is supposed to 
imply that the final decisions issued by the UOKiK President may be primarily 
of ‘historical interest’ for those injured by competition restraints. 
Public antitrust enforcement is not a direct way to compensate victims 
of competition restraints. It may, however, facilitate access to redress when 
damages claims are brought forward on the basis of infringement decisions 
taken by the European Commission or an NCA, provided that the possibility 
of so called ‘follow-on actions’ is preserved. Follow-on actions are considerably 
simpler to pursue than stand-alone actions, where there is a need to prove an 
antitrust infringement. Therefore, final antitrust decisions are usually of more 
than just ‘historical interest’ for those injured by restraints of competition. 
The Polish jurisprudence concerning private antitrust enforcement surrounds 
this very issue. Not later than a few months after the publication of the 2008 
20 Available at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc5.nsf/opisy/1110.htm.
21 Council Regulation No. 1/2003 of 16/12/02 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, OJ [2003] L 1/1.
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White Paper, the Polish Supreme Court stated in a resolution22 that ordinary 
courts are competent to decide whether or not an abuse of a dominant position 
had occurred if such an assessment is necessary to declare an agreement lawful 
or illegal and thus void (unlike the EU, legal actions constituting an abuse are 
null and void ex lege in Poland). The Supreme Court declared also that courts 
do not have such competences if the UOKiK President has already issued 
afinal decision concluding that an infringement had indeed taken place. In such 
cases, a final decision of the UOKiK President was binding on the courts. The 
Supreme Court stressed furthermore that courts should always assess whether 
it is necessary to suspend proceedings, pursuant to Article 177(1)(3) of the 
Civil Procedure Code23, awaiting the conclusion of administrative proceedings 
already underway before the UOKiK President. Article 177(1)(3) provides that 
the court may (but is not obliged to) stay its proceedings, ex officio, where 
resolution of the case is dependent upon a prior decision of an administrative 
authority (such as the UOKiK President). Although the 2008 Resolution 
explicitly concerns a specific group of competition-restricting practices only 
(dominant position abuses) it can be applied to a wider range of restrictive 
practices including anti-competitive agreements. 
The ‘prejudicial’ (in Polish: prejudycjalność) nature of administrative 
decisions in antitrust cases, in other words, the fact that they are binding on 
courts assessing related civil law claims, has been highly disputed in Poland for 
the last two decades. Although a rich body of jurisprudence has developed on 
this subject, the judiciary has shown divergent views of this key concept. On 
one hand, the Supreme Court concluded in a series of judgments24 that where 
the declaration of the invalidity of an agreement is at stake, the concept of 
the prejudicial character of UOKiK decisions demanded that the competition 
authority must rule first that an antitrust infringement had indeed occurred. 
This approach has undoubtedly the general effect of erecting barriers to the 
development of private antitrust enforcement. 
On the other hand, however, examples exist of more effective judicial 
interpretation which suggests that the weakness of Polish private antitrust 
enforcement might not only derive from the content of existing legislation 
but also from its interpretation. Just after Poland’s accession to the European 
Union in 200425, the Supreme Court stated, in accordance with its earlier 
22 Resolution of 23 July 2008, III CZP 52/08, (2009) 2 Monitor Prawniczy 90.
23 Journal of Laws 1964 No. 43, item 296, as amended.
24 Ruling of 27 October 1995, III CZP 135/95, LEX No. 24705, much criticized by S. Gronowski, 
‘Glosa do postanowienia SN z dnia 27 października 1995 r., III CZP 135/95’ (1996) 6 Orzecznictwo 
Sądów Polskich 112 et seq.; judgment of 28 April 2004, III CK 521/02, LEX No. 255591.
25 See judgments of: 2 March 2006, I CSK 83/05, LEX No. 369165; 5 January 2007, III SK 
17/06, LEX No. 489018; 4 March 2008, IV CSK 441/07, LEX No. 376385. 
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judgment of 22 February 199426, that an assessment whether an agreement 
has infringed the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements may be carried 
out in civil litigations between private parties. 
Since then, the process of increasing homogeneity of Polish jurisprudence 
has been remarkably smooth. It is possible to say, in light of the 2008 Resolution 
of the Supreme Court, that Polish jurisprudence on the prejudicial nature of 
antitrust decisions is well-established. What it did lack was the analysis of the 
consequences of an antitrust decision accepting binding commitments. The 
Supreme Court emphasised therefore in its Resolution that a ‘commitments’ 
decision did not determine the existence of an antitrust infringement. The 
plausibility of the existence of a competition law violation is a necessary (sine 
qua non) and sufficient requirement for a commitments decision, in other 
words, it is not necessary to prove and firmly determine therein whether an 
infringement of antitrust provisions had actually taken place. Commitment 
decisions refer thus to ‘potential’ violations only. As such, a commitments 
decision is not in any way prejudicial for ordinary courts. 
There was a deeper reason for the discussed development in Polish 
jurisprudence. The Supreme Court analysed solutions offered by EU legislation 
and jurisprudence (however, it did not refer to soft law documents such as 
Papers) and concluded that its own views were additionally supported by the 
results of this analysis. 
Is it possible to see in the 2008 Resolution nothing more than the end of 
the discussion in Polish jurisprudence on the prejudicial standing of antitrust 
decisions? The answer is, in fact, no. The Resolution has already been followed 
by the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Warsaw of 25 November 2009 
(VI ACa 422/09)27. The Appeals Court, referring to the 2008 Resolution, 
determined that an ordinary court in a particular case could determine for 
itself whether or not it should examine the anti-competitiveness (illegality) 
of a given conduct, that is, unless administrative proceedings were underway 
before the UOKiK President in this regard. It is unclear whether this Appeals 
Court spoke in line with the 2008 Resolution. The Supreme Court allowed 
courts to independently assess the need to stall their own proceedings awaiting 
a decision from the UOKiK President. According to the Supreme Court, the 
discretion of the courts is precluded in this respect only by the existence of 
a final infringement decision issued by the UOKiK President (seeing as such 
a decision is binding on the court). The Appeals Court seems to have gone 
further than the Supreme Court – its ruling suggests, a contrario, that the very 
commencement of antitrust proceedings precludes courts from independently 
examining the anti-competitiveness of a given market conduct. As a result, 
26 I CRN 238/93, LEX No. 4060.
27 LEX No. 1120262.
VOL. 2012, 5(7)
STILL-UNPOPULAR SANCTIONS: DEVELOPMENTS IN PRIVATE… 65
courts should wait for the outcome of the proceedings before the UOKiK 
President. 
It is worth investigating here the accessibility of Polish jurisprudence 
regarding private antitrust enforcement. Unfortunately, access to information 
on this subject is greatly lacking. Courts keep cases registers, including 
civil law cases, and case information is given in the form of code numbers 
according to a classification system28. Private antitrust actions included in 
index ‘GC’ have not been given a specific code; actions in unfair competition 
cases are classified as 652; tort actions are labelled 667. To make matters 
worse, also index ‘C’ lacks a specific code for private antitrust actions. Worse 
yet, ordinary courts seem frequently unable to distinguish between unfair 
competition actions and private antitrust actions29. As a result, it is by no 
means surprising that it is practically impossible to research Polish private 
antitrust actions in a coherent manner30. Oddly enough for the Polish history 
of private antitrust enforcement, the authorities seam to support the status 
quo which sees private antitrust enforcement remaining weak and unpopular. 
Unlike other NCAs31, the UOKiK President has not been given any measures 
to ensure data collection on antitrust actions. How can Poland be ready for 
a reform of private antitrust enforcement if the scale of the phenomenon is 
not even known? Why should special departments be created within existing 
court structures in order to rule on antitrust cases if it might emerge that 
there is little need for such change because of their rarity on court dockets? 
Legislative changes must therefore be advocated. First, a separate code for 
private antitrust actions should be introduced32. Second, courts should inform 
the Justice Minister, who should in turn inform the UOKiK President, about 
28 Explained in the Appendix to the Decree of the Minister of Justice of 12 December 2003 
on the organisation and scope of work of the court secretariats and other departments of the 
court service; Official Journal of the Minister of Justice No. 5, item 22, as amended.
29 Mistakes in this respect can be found even in the above mentioned resolution of 23 July 
2008, III CZP 52/08, and judgment of the Appeals Court in Warsaw of 25 November 2009 
(VI ACa 422/09).
30 The Author has been involved since 2011 in project No. 524/BMN intended to prepare 
a statistical analysis of unfair competition actions. For example, between 2009-2011, only 8 such 
claims were filed in the Commercial Regional Court in Białystok and it is unknown how many, 
if any, of them are cases alleging antitrust violations. It would be surely beneficial to consider 
antitrust actions only. 
31 E.g. the German NCA (Bundeskartellamt) has to be informed about all civil litigations 
concerning antitrust infringements including Articles 101 & 102 TFEU, and may decide to 
participate therein. It thus has at its disposal full data on private antitrust enforcement in 
Germany; see S.E. Keske, Group Litigation in European Competition Law, Antwerp – Oxford 
– Portland 2010, p. 231.
32 Into the Appendix to the Decree; see footnote 28. 
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all private antitrust actions (alternatively, courts should send such information 
directly to the UOKiK President). 
Regarding actions for the breach of EU antitrust rules, it is worth drawing 
particular attention to Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003. When national 
courts rule on agreements, decisions or concerted practices under Article 101 
and 102 TFEU that are already the subject of a Commission decision, they 
cannot deliver judgments running counter to an earlier EU decision. National 
courts must also avoid delivering rulings which would conflict with a decision 
contemplated by the Commission during existing proceedings. To that effect, 
national courts may assess whether it is necessary to suspend their proceedings 
awaiting a decision from the Commission.
All civil courts (courts for civil litigation), including commercial ones, need 
to be able to address certain problems unique to competition law, be it EU or 
national provisions. That is true even for inexperienced courts and it is in fact 
rare for judges involved in private enforcement of competition law to have 
frequent contact with antitrust issues. It cannot be common practice for courts 
to depend solely on Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003 which makes it possible 
for them to ask the Commission for information or its opinions on questions 
concerning the application of the EU competition rules in proceedings based 
on Article 101 and 102 TFEU. Although the Commission does not seem 
obliged to respond to such request, it is likely that it will do whatever it can 
to help a national court (pursuant to the spirit of the TFUE, rather than to 
the letter of EU law). Asking a rhetorical question, who can national courts 
ask for help in the application of domestic competition law? That is why the 
importance of training national judges in both EU and national antitrust 
provisions cannot be stressed enough.
It is worth noting in the closing lines of this section that jurisprudential 
developments concerning the prejudicial character of antitrust decisions in 
Poland should be reflected in legislation in a similar way to that of Regulation 
1/2003. Plaintiffs in follow-on actions are not required to prove an antitrust 
infringement. The absence of such legal provision is somewhat compensated 
by the 2008 Resolution of the Supreme Court. However, there is no stare 
decisis rule in the Polish legal system whereby lower courts may deviate in 
a given case from the views of the Supreme Court expressed elsewhere. The 
outcomes of the 2008 Resolution should, therefore, be codified into positive 
laws in order to reduce legal uncertainty on the side of the plaintiffs. Such an 
amendment might increase the number of civil antitrust lawsuits in Poland 
and, thus, act as an effective deterrent for antitrust violations. However, Polish 
legislation remains unclear on issues surrounding private antitrust enforcement 
– a fact that seems to deter potential plaintiffs from taking this road of action. 
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3. Collective redress 
Collective redress has been subject to much debate in Europe, and with 
reason. Private antitrust enforcement is expensive, time consuming, complex 
and inefficient. The concept of group proceedings emerged in Europe, 
modelled after American class actions, as a centrepiece for private enforcement 
of competition law33. The Act of 2009 on the Pursuit of Claims in Group 
Proceedings34 came into force in Poland on 19 July 2010. An opt-in procedure 
was adopted therein (as opposed to the American-style opt-out system). 
Accordingly, an action may be pursued in group proceedings in Poland if 
a group comprised of at least 10 persons (consumers, undertakings, natural 
persons, legal entities etc.) files claims of the same type and based on the 
same or identical factual basis. The Act can be applied only to such issues 
as consumer protection, product and tort liability (except personal rights’ 
protection) as well as competition protection albeit antitrust claims are included 
in ‘roundabout’ terms [Article 1(2)]. While it is regrettable that Article 1(2) 
of the Act is not detailed enough, when taken in the general context, it is 
clear that it must be understood as referring to private antitrust claims also. 
Competition law infringements can be thought of as a form of torts. This paper 
is not meant to provide a detailed answer to the question on what are the legal 
bases for private antitrust enforcement in Poland or, what are the categories 
of sanctions (claims) provided for them. Influential commentators35 stress 
nevertheless that competition restricting market practices are torts within the 
meaning of civil law provided that the requirements (prerequisites) for the 
tort are met. This realisation stands be it under the tort law provisions of the 
Civil Code36 (Article 415 et seq.) taken in isolation or in conjunction with 
other provisions such as Article 18(1)(4) of the Act of 1993 on Combating 
Unfair Competition37 or Article 12(1)(4) of the Act on Counteracting Unfair 
Market Practices38. 
In other words, private damages actions for torts, consisting of a breach 
of competition law (including EU antitrust rules), can be pursued in group 
33 The term ‘group action’ is used in Europe, while the term ‘class action’ is used in the U.S. 
See M. Deguchi, ‘The Recent Legislation on the Consumer Group Action in Japan’, [in:] The 
Recent Tendencies of Development in Civil Procedure Law – between East and West. International 
Conference, Vilnius 2007, p. 126.
34 Journal of Laws 2010 No. 7, item 44.
35 See i.a. A. Jurkowska, ‘Antitrust Private Enforcement…’, p. 65–67; P. Podrecki, ‘Civil 
Law Actions…’, p. 87–88.
36 Journal of Laws 1964 No. 16, item 93, as amended. 
37 Consolidated text: Journal of Laws 2003 No. 153, item 1503, as amended.
38 Journal of Laws 2007 No. 171, item 1206.
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proceedings in Poland. Importantly also, the Act does not reserve the benefit 
of group proceedings exclusively to consumers and thus the said ‘group’ can 
include undertakings39. 
Does the Polish Act on the Pursuit of Claims in Group Proceedings facilitate 
private antitrust enforcement? Can it be considered a real development 
thereof? It does not adopt any specific rules for measuring damages. It does 
not introduce any presumptions nor does it introduce the concept of a ‘reverse 
burden of proof’ or even introduce a less stringent standard of proof for 
plaintiffs in such cases. Have group plaintiffs less responsibilities, less ‘burdens’ 
than individual ones? Existing legal provisions may suggest the opposite. 
In group proceedings, legal representation by a barrister or legal advisor is 
compulsory for the plaintiff unless the plaintiff is a barrister or legal advisor 
himself/herself. Perhaps this provision originates from the positive intention 
of the legislator – it might have been designed so as to reduce of anticipated 
problems associated with proofs and evidence40. Article 2(1) of the Act 
puts another type of ‘pressure’ on group plaintiffs. It stipulates that in cases 
concerning pecuniary claims the amount of individual claims, which make 
up the overall group litigation, have to be standardised. If standardisation 
is not approved by all members, group proceedings will not be allowed by 
the court. These difficulties are eased under Article 2(2) which states that 
standardisation can be made in subgroups of at least 2 participants.
Nevertheless, group proceedings do have some clear advantages over other 
types of civil proceedings. First of all, court fees are lower. As a rule, court 
registration fee for group proceedings in Poland amounts to 2% of the claim, 
not less than PLN 30 (approx. EUR 7) and not more than PLN 100,000.00 
(approx. EUR 24,100). By contrast, 5% of the claim is generally applicable 
for individual proceedings. Second, Article 5 of the Act is advantageous for 
barristers and legal advisors of group plaintiffs. If their fees are based on a 
contingency fee agreement, the court shall award them not more than 20% of 
the amount awarded to the plaintiffs, with no further conditions. In individual 
proceedings, the contribution of the losing party toward the fees for the 
winning lawyers have, as a rule, the highest minimum value of PLN 7,200.00 
(approx. EUR 1,735) where the claim is over PLN 200,000.00 (approx. EUR 
48,200). The court can increase it by up to six fold (here, to PLN 43,200.00, 
approx. EUR 10,410) but that is dependent on such factors as: the nature of 
the case, lawyers’ effort, his or her contribution to clarifying and/or bringing 
39 By contrast, the use of group proceedings is reserved exclusively to consumers, for 
example, in Finland. See L. Ervo, Characteristics of Procedure [in:] L. Ervo (ed.), Civil Justice 
in Finland, Tokyo 2009, p. 92. 
40 See M. Sieradzka, Ustawa o dochodzeniu roszczeń w postępowaniu grupowym. Komentarz, 
Warszawa 2010, p. 107.
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the case to a resolution. The same fee could be obtained from the losing 
party in group proceedings where the claim is PLN 216,000.00 (approx. EUR 
52,057) irrespective of any of the above factors. The third benefit of group 
actions lies in the fact that they fall within the competence of district courts 
(in Polish: sądy okręgowe). As a result, they are judged by a panel of three 
professional judges. Their superior experience and expertise is likely to allow 
them to handle such complex cases better than a single professional judge at 
a regional court. Another advantage of group proceedings used to lie in the 
fact that legislation on commercial proceedings was not applicable to group 
proceedings. However, it is worth remembering that Poland no longer has 
separate commercial proceedings (see section below). 
The statement of claim is submitted in group proceedings by a representative 
of the entire group, a position that can be held either by a member of the 
group or a regional (in Polish: poviat) consumer ombudsman. What can be 
said against the involvement of consumer ombudsmen in the pursuit of group 
actions is that they did not used to represent consumers in court proceedings. 
Figures published by the UOKiK President show only three cases where 
consumer ombudsmen took action in 2010 under the Act on the Pursuit of 
Claims in Group Proceedings41. 
It might seem that group proceedings would occupy a growing place in 
Polish antitrust enforcement and policy. This ‘achievement’ should, therefore, 
not be over-emphasized because it says more about where the country was 
in 2010 than where it stands today. In Poland, a tendency to think that legal 
amendments should result in the removal of barriers to private enforcement 
(or at least lowering them) has been apparent42. 
The empirical analysis of group actions of 2010–2011 has been conducted 
in all Polish district courts43 taking note, in particular, if unfair competition or 
private antitrust actions were among them. The feedback is positive from most 
of the examined courts, but certainly not from all. It can only be hoped that 
future research will present complete statistical data in this field. So far only 
one ‘class action’ is known to have been filed in Poland regarding competition 
protection since the Act on Pursuit of Claims in Group Proceedings came 
41 Funkcjonowanie powiatowych (miejskich) rzeczników konsumentów w roku 2010, UOKiK, 
Warszawa 2011, p. 21.
42 See M. Sieradzka, Pozew grupowy jako instrument prywatnoprawnej ochrony interesów 
konsumentów z tytułu naruszenia reguł konkurencji, Warszawa 2012, p. 506 et seq.; P. Podrecki, 
‘Civil Law Actions…’, p. 95. 
43 Statistical data has been gathered in projects No. 524/BMN (closed) and 538/BMN 
(in progress). Less than twenty courts (civil or commercial departments), excluding courts in 
Warsaw, have not yet responded. 
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into force. However, it is not an antitrust but an unfair competition action 
(concerning misleading advertising).
Data suggests that victims are unwilling to take legal actions and to make 
use of the available solutions. The Polish legislator provided victims with 
a  legal tool in the forms of private antitrust enforcement, but they do not 
take advantage thereof. These inefficiencies are surprising when compared to 
the legislative and organisational effort that has been put into creating them. 
However, this is a problem that elicits a question of what challenges are faced 
by policy makers who attempt to facilitate private antitrust enforcement? What 
sort of resistance do they encounter? Potential plaintiffs are influenced by 
various motives that cannot be quantitatively measured. Most of all, however, 
opting-in requires efforts on the side of the individual who initiates the group 
action44. He/she has to gather information and provide evidence. What 
hampers private antitrust enforcement in Poland is thus not only substantive 
law but the lack of incentives for such enforcement also.
Without speaking for or against the Polish Act on the Pursuit of Claims in 
Group Proceedings, this paper merely acknowledges the existence of a number 
of future problems associated with its provisions. Its adoption was motivated 
by clearly significant reasons such as: improving access to courts; increasing 
legal protection; improving the administration of justice and judicial economy; 
relieving courts of the obligation to hear multiple factually similar cases with 
different plaintiffs; reducing court costs; ensuring consistency of judgments 
in similar cases. The achievement of the aforementioned goals requires 
sophisticated tools, which the Act deals with. However, the explanatory notes 
to the draft bill45 mention neither related EU documents nor the need for 
a reform of private antitrust enforcement in Poland as the underlying reasons 
for this legislative initiative. 
4. Evidence 
The 2008 White Paper concerns, among other things, the problem of 
asserting claims by entities positioned on different levels in the supply chain, 
including end-consumers (so called indirect purchasers). End-users may 
assert claims directly against the antitrust infringer in Poland. In practice, 
most indirect purchasers are individual consumers; no legal obstacle prevents 
them from initiating antitrust litigation to recover their damages. There are, 
however, factual obstacles in this respect namely significant difficulties in 
obtaining evidence necessary for proving the passing-on of supra-competitive 
44 See S.E. Keske, Group Litigation in…, p. 156. 
45 Available at http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/proc6.nsf/opisy/1829.htm. 
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prices and their extent. These problems result from the considerable distance 
that frequently exists between final consumers and the place in the supply 
chain where the antitrust violation occurs. Polish legislation lacks the 
American-style, wide-ranging form of discovery of admissible evidence. The 
principle of ‘non-self-incrimination’ protects the alleged infringer against 
helping the opponent46. 
Regarding EU antitrust law, Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003 stipulates that 
in any national or EU proceedings for the application of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU, the burden of proving an infringement of Article 101(1) or Article 
102 TFEU shall rest on the party or the authority alleging the violation. An 
undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the benefit of Article 
101(3) TFEU shall bear the burden of proving that the conditions of that 
paragraph are fulfilled. It is worth noting that according to recital (5) of its 
preamble, Regulation 1/2003 affects neither national rules on the standard of 
proof nor obligations of NCAs and national courts to ascertain the facts of 
a case, provided that such rules and obligations are compatible with general 
principles of EU law.
Burden of proof principles are rigid for plaintiffs in Poland. Critics of 
commercial proceedings used to complain, in particular, about the rules on 
the burden of proof applicable to undertakings – the so-called ‘non-admission 
of evidence’ principle (in Polish: prekluzja dowodowa). Pursuant to this rule, 
evidence could be filed by the parties to commercial proceedings only within 
the dates specified by the provisions of Article 47912 § 1 and Article 47914 
§ 1–2 of the Civil Procedure Code (the so-called statutory non-admission of 
evidence). The plaintiff had to include all allegations in the statement of claim 
as well as indicate all evidence to support these allegations. The court would 
ignore late allegations and/or evidence not filed within the deadlines laid out 
by the Civil Procedure Code. They could be admitted only exceptionally if the 
plaintiff proved that it had been impossible to include them in the statement 
of claim or the need thereof had not occurred before (in such cases a two 
week deadline was given). On the other hand, defendants would be precluded 
from making allegations/presenting corresponding evidence if they failed to 
include them in the response to the statement of claim and failed to prove 
the applicability of one of aforementioned exceptions. The reason for the 
use of the statutory non-admission of evidence principle was to facilitate and 
shorten commercial proceedings. Incidentally, non-admission of evidence was 
the subject of almost every discussion concerning commercial proceedings – it 
was, so to speak, an issue ‘floating’ above the entire debate. Widely criticised 
46 See G. Wagner, ‘Should Private Enforcement of Competition Law Be Strengthened?’, 
[in:] D. Schmidtchen, M. Albert, S. Voigt (eds), The More Economic Approach to European 
Competition Law, Tübingen 2007, p. 123.
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was particularly the fact that the prime task of a commercial trial was to speed 
up proceedings rather than find the material truth of the case (and achieve 
justice)47. 
The Polish legislature adopted on 16 September 2011 the Act amending 
the Civil Procedure Code and Some Other Acts48 abolishing, as of 3 May 
2012, all specific provisions governing commercial proceedings, including the 
statutory non-admission of evidence principle. The amended Articles 207 and 
217 of the Civil Procedure Code are now applicable instead with respect to 
evidence making no difference between submissions by undertakings and other 
parties to the proceedings. According to Article 207(2), the presiding judge 
may order the defendant to make a statement in response to the statement 
of claim within the period of at least two weeks. The presiding judge may 
also, before the first sitting of the court, require the parties to file further 
submissions, giving them directions on the order of submissions, deadlines and 
stress points that must be explained and clarified. Parties are not allowed to 
file any submissions other than a statement of claim, response to the statement 
of claim and those required by the court unless such submissions contain 
additional evidentiary motions only. The court shall ignore any late allegations 
and/or evidence unless the submitting parties presents plausible reasons in 
support of the conjecture that: 1) the delay is not caused by their fault or 
2) investigating late allegations and evidence will not lead to a delay in the 
resolution of the case or 3) there are other exceptional circumstances. On the 
other hand, Article 217(1) seems to conflict Articles 207 seeing as it stipulates 
that any allegations and submissions of evidence to substantiate each fact 
and matter alleged and/or to refute and rebut any evidence and arguments 
of the opponent must be made before the closing of the hearing. However, 
existing literature on the amendment suggests that Article 207 of the Civil 
Procedure Code takes precedence over Article 21749. It seems that statutory 
non-admission of evidence, which used to apply to commercial proceedings, 
has now been replaced by judicial non-admission of evidence. In fact, not only 
has the old principle been retained merely in a different form (statutory vs. 
judicial), the scope of its applicability has increased. While it used to apply 
to undertakings only (parties to commercial proceedings only), it now covers 
parties to all types of civil law proceedings, including consumers. The previous 
47 More T. Szanciło, ‘Pozycja procesowa przedsiębiorcy po zmianach Kodeksu postępowania 
cywilnego’ (2012) 125 Radca Prawny 10D.
48 Journal of Laws 2011 No. 233, item 1381. 
49 J. Mucha, ‘Ciężar wspierania postępowania i granice dyskrecjonalnej władzy sędziego 
w świetle znowelizowanych przepisów Kodeksu postępowania cywilnego’ (2012) 126 Radca 
Prawny 3D. 
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solution was considered inflexible, but at the same time transparent50 – the 
new approach seems to considerably reduce legal certainty for all parties. 
Under the new approach it is possible that the presiding judge will not permit 
the parties to file any submissions other than the statement of claim and 
a response by the defendant51. 
There is no reason to think that the aforementioned developments have 
been inspired by EU initiatives concerning private antitrust enforcement 
primarily because the amendment is not limited to antitrust actions. Even final 
consumers not represented by a lawyer are now bound not only by ordinary 
rules on the burden of proof but also by the principle of judicial non-admission 
of evidence. And these principles are strict for plaintiffs. Is there any chance 
that the said amendment will contribute to the facilitation of private antitrust 
enforcement in Poland? 
The non-admission of evidence principle remains part of the Civil Procedure 
Code albeit it has taken on a different form. If Article 207, as speculated, is 
today’s version of the statutory non-admission of evidence principle that used 
to apply to commercial proceedings, then in truth not much has changed 
for undertakings as antitrust plaintiffs. As in the past, they must still find 
their way in a restrictive model of court proceedings, perhaps slightly more 
irregular than before because its schedule is now dictated not only by statutory 
means (the Civil Procedure Code) but also by the judiciary. For consumers, 
however, the situation has notably worsened since the risks connected with 
litigation have multiplied. If a consumer-plaintiff is not sufficiently familiar 
with procedures and there is a higher risk that evidence requirements are not 
met, his/her claim is more likely to fail. Thus, the new rules may act as a very 
significant disincentive for individual consumers to file antitrust lawsuits. 
If only victims made use of existing possibilities, there could be a demand 
for a jurisprudential development in the area of access to evidence – an issue 
recently considered by the Court of Justice of the EU. On 14 June 2011, the 
Court reached its long-awaited verdict in Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt52. 
The judgment focuses on access of antitrust victims to documents and 
information provided under a national leniency programme. The Court 
declared therein that the ‘provisions of European Union law on cartels, (…), 
must be interpreted as not precluding a person who has been adversely affected 
by an infringement of European Union competition law and is seeking to 
obtain damages from being granted access to documents relating to a leniency 
procedure involving the perpetrator of that infringement’. According to the 
Court, it is for the courts and tribunals of the Member States, on the basis 
50 J. Mucha, ‘Ciężar wspierania…’, p. 6D. 
51 See P. Kosiński, ‘Prekluzja dla wszystkich’ (2012) 124 Radca Prawny 29.
52 Case C-360/09.
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of their national laws, to determine the conditions under which such access 
must be permitted or denied by weighing the different interests protected by 
EU law. Polish jurisprudence presents the opinion that national law enforcers 
should use purposive interpretation in order to achieve an outcome consistent 
with the objectives pursued by EU law. The Polish Supreme Court emphasised 
that such consistency could be obtained by referring not only to the letter of 
the law (legislation) but also to EU case law53. In the aforementioned 2008 
Resolution, the Supreme Court spoke in favour of interpreting national laws 
so as to eliminate basic procedural discrepancies between the application of 
EU legislation and national law. Therefore, the Pfleiderer judgment is likely 
to help believe in the possibility of an improvement in the way injured parties 
regard seeking compensation for national antitrust infringements. 
5.  Remaining factors influencing private antitrust enforcement 
(instead of an epilogue)
There have been no developments likely to impact private antitrust 
enforcement in Poland with respect to other contagious issues such as: 
disclosure inter partes; calculation of damages; passing-on of overcharges; 
limitation periods; or costs of damages actions (apart from special rules 
for group litigation). The ‘fault requirement’, acting as a prerequisite for 
compensation, has not been eliminated either. Indeed, it should be expected 
that changes in this field are likely to occur only if EU Member States are 
made to do so. 
The UOKiK President published for public consultation in May 2012 
(amended in July 2012) a proposal for assumptions underlying an Amendment 
Act of the Competition Act of 200754. Despite the fact that the draft covers 
the topic of leniency and ‘fashionable’ leniency plus, it does not take into 
consideration the wide spectrum of issues surrounding the interaction 
between leniency and actions for damages. The proposal does not even refer 
to the aforementioned Resolution of the Meeting of Heads of the European 
Competition Authorities of 23 May 2012 on protection of leniency material 
in the context of civil damages actions. 
It is, nevertheless, possible to identify a step forward in addressing the issue 
of private antitrust enforcement in the draft’s newest version of July 2012. The 
UOKiK President agreed to include a proposal by the Polish Competition 
Law Association submitted during the public consultation. The Association 
recommended for the Competition Act to cover provisions which would allow 
53 Judgment of the Supreme Court of 29 May 2001, I CKN 1217/98, LEX No. 47587.
54 Available at http://legislacja.rcl.gov.pl/lista/1/projekt/43452/katalog/43464. See p. 16–20.
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the UOKiK President to submit an opinion relevant to a case subject to court 
proceedings (other than those referred to in Part I Book I Title VII Section 
IVa of the Code of Civil Procedure), such as proceedings relating to private 
claims arising from an antitrust violation55. The future challenge lies now in 
an effective incorporation of this proposal into the Competition Act and, then, 
its practical implementation. 
IV. Summary 
Public antitrust enforcement is considerably stronger in Poland than its 
private counterpart. In fact, they are hardly partners at all since private 
enforcement remains poorly developed and its popularization is being 
disfavoured by national legislation regarding the procedural situation of 
plaintiffs. 
The aim of this paper was to assess if there is a chance that recent 
jurisprudential and legislative developments will help facilitate private antitrust 
enforcement in Poland. If a quantitative comparison is made between Polish 
initiatives and those in the European Union, Polish advancements might seem 
to stand up to the comparison quite well. The paper identified two pieces of 
national legislation (hard law), adopted in the last two years that may have an 
effect on private antitrust enforcement. Asking, however, how much were they 
inspired by the needs of victims of competition restraints, the conclusion might 
emerge that their authors did not even think of private antitrust enforcement 
during the legislative process. Moreover, neither the 2008 White Paper nor 
subsequent actions of the European Commission have managed to provide 
a key stimulus in the development of private antitrust enforcement in Poland. 
National authorities proved to be neither constructive reformers nor 
revolutionaries. Unfortunately, with two steps forward (jurisprudence on the 
prejudicial effect of antitrust decisions, legislation on group proceedings), 
two steps back were taken (non-admission of evidence in proceedings with 
consumers as parties). Potential plaintiffs will react accordingly. 
It has been more than four years since the 2008 White Paper and yet 
Polish legislature continues to lack an overall idea on how to re-design 
55 It is worth noting that Article 47929a (1)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure stipulates that 
if the provisions of a separate act grant an entity that does not participate in the case the right to 
submit an opinion relevant to the case, Article 63 shall be applied respectively thereto. Article 
47929a was added as of 03/05/12 and replaced the now-repealed Article 4796a using identical 
wording. The latter was introduced in 2004 by the Polish legislature inspired by Article 15 of 
Regulation 1/2003.
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the still vastly unpopular private antitrust sanctions and their enforcement. 
The impression emerges at present that the authorities are waiting for the 
European Commission to take definite actions. The pace of the evolutionary 
processes of Member States’ competition laws has historically seldom been 
quickened by anything other than EU initiative. One can thus expect such an 
initiative in the field of private antitrust enforcement to follow. 
It does not seem appropriate to take such a long path to ‘sustainable 
antitrust enforcement’ and achieving a balance between public (administrative) 
and private (civil law) antitrust enforcement. However, increasing the scale 
of private actions should not be an aim in and of itself since increasing the 
workload of courts cannot be advocated. The aim of the reform of the antitrust 
enforcement system should be, first of all, to decrease the percentage of 
victims who have not been compensated. Therefore, infringers should be first 
and foremost persuaded to compensate their victims voluntarily. Encouraging 
victims to file damages claims in courts should be a secondary aim. But this 
is a vast subject beyond the scope of this paper. 
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